DECISIVE BATTLES OF THE CIVIL WAR
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WILDERNESS
May 5 - 6, 1864

Fought in the tangle of undergrowth that had overset Joe Hooker, the battle of Wilderness was a total and bloody confusion. Normally steady troops often broke and ran when unexpected attacks broke out of tangled vegetation a bare 20 yards away and on both sides units tended to become mixed, making the transmission of orders difficult.

Three main roads led into the Wilderness from the west and south-west: the Turnpike and Plank Roads from Orange, and the Catharpin Road from Gordonsville. Ewell was ordered to take his corps along the plank road and form a defensive position and wait for Hill, on the Plank Road and Longstreet on the Catharpin to arrive. Longstreet had much farther to travel than the other two.

Ewell deployed successfully and ran into Warren's corps. Initially, Ewell's forward brigade was routed but the attackers were soon outflanked and routed in their turn. Two more blue divisions were surprised and driven off, some fleeing into Confederate lines so completely had they lost their sense of direction. Ewell did not advance beyond his original position and spent the afternoon digging in.

Hill, coming slightly later up the plank road, made heavy contact with Hancock who had been given orders to backtrack from the Catharpin Road to deal with him. The terrain decisively favoured the Confederate defenders but it was still 25,000 versus 7,500 and Hancock would probably have broken through were it not for the fall of darkness.

Both commanders were planning attacks for the following day. Grant sent Burnside to fill the gap between Warren and Hancock and Warren was to keep Ewell occupied while the main attack went in on Hill. Lee planned to shift Longstreet from the Catharpin Road to the Plank Road and have Hill sidle north to fill the gap.

Longstreet's corps was delayed until well after sunrise. Hill's troops, who had neglected to entrench overnight, were pushed back, although in good order, and matters were getting critical when Longstreet's lead brigade finally arrived. By about 10.00 o'clock, the line had been restored.

There was then something of a lull. Grant, at this point, had both flanks exposed and no centre, for Burnside had got himself lost in the tangle and was wandering around in

circles with two divisions. Ironically, by having disappeared, Burnside put in an effective defence on the right flank. Gordon, commanding the Confederate far left brigade repeatedly asked permission to attack the open flank but was refused because Burnside was unaccounted for.
On the Union left, not only was Hancock's flank open, but an unfinished railroad cutting led right up to it. Longstreet was not the man to miss such an opportunity and he sent Sorrel with three brigades into the attack. At 11.00 am he exploded into the Union flank with dynamic results. As Hancock said to Longstreet years later "You rolled me up like a wet blanket."
The Confederate units had become terribly mixed-up, however, and two actually started firing on each other. Longstreet went forward to stop it and was badly wounded and had to be carried from the field. Command went to General Field who spent the next four hours sorting the units back into some sort of order.
At 6.00 pm Gordon finally got permission to attack the Union right when Lee himself came up to investigate. Burnside had by this time found the centre opposite Hill and his phantom flank protection worked no longer. Gordon charged in and started to roll up the flank, but darkness fell before Grant suffered any major disaster.
The following day saw both sides entrenched and very little fighting. Grant had been decisively beaten, losing 17,666 casualties to his opponent's 7,800 and being turned on both flanks. It was a far worse disaster than Hooker had suffered on the same ground. Unlike Hooker, however, Grant managed to avoid defeat by the simple expedient of refusing to acknowledge it. He marched for Spotsylvania and Lee would have to do his work all over again.
PLAYER'S NOTES
Union. As Grant, your first task is to prevent the advancing units of A. P. Hill's Corps from reaching the Brock Road. Only then can you afford the luxury of planning offensive moves. The North has the initiative but be ready for Longstreet's arrival on Day 2. If you lose control of the Brock Road you will probably lose the game.
Confederate. Lee must drive quickly along the Orange Plank Road until a solid Union line is encountered, then extend his flanks and consolidate. Pushing too hard against Union positions that are steadily being reinforced will drain too much Southern blood. Place your artillery carefully as there are few open areas for its effective employment. (Note that artillery units cannot move through wilderness unless a

track is present.) The South can win without cutting the Brock Road but to do so you must dish out much more punishment than you take.

SCENARIO VARIANTS

(1). Lee commanded the battle from the south and gave Ewell little guidance apart from instructing him to coordinate his actions by reference to the sound of the battle raging to his south. To give Lee a different perspective, we can start him on the northern flank with Ewell. Do this by changing the South's Army HQ location to 0,11.

(2). Each commander had only a limited knowledge of his opponent's forces and strength throughout this engagement. To create more uncertainty during the game, modify the arrival times for the following units, using either or both options as you choose:

(a). Longstreet arrives earlier. Change Longstreet's HQ and Brigades arrival time to Day 1, 11 am and the likelihood value to 5.

(b). Hancock's arrival uncertain. Subtract 7 from Hancock's HQ and Brigade arrival times and change likelihood to 2.

SPOTSYLVANIA

May 10 - 12, 1864

After the battle of Wilderness, Grant attempted to march around Lee's right flank to Spotsylvania and thus place himself between his opponent and his capital, Richmond. Lee, however, anticipated the movement and Anderson, leading the vanguard, was just in time to hold off Grant's lead elements. On 9th May there was some skirmishing, during which Sedgwick, one of Grant's ablest commanders, was killed by a sniper but the main activity was Confederate troops digging into a strongly fortified position.

Grant was left with three unpalatable alternatives. Do nothing (the McClellan gambit). This would allow Lee to detach troops elsewhere. Manoeuvre around Lee again (the Sherman/Grant gambit). This would simply postpone the confrontation, shortening Lee's lines of communication in the process. Assault the fortifications (the Burnside gambit). This would almost certainly lead to a bloody repulse.

To one of Grant's temperament, option three was really the only choice despite the risks. A major assault was planned for 5 pm. Warren appealed for permission to attack early, believing he saw the possibility of a breakthrough. Grant let him have his head but Warren was repulsed in what was to prove the pattern of the day.

Colonel Emory Upton, however, came up with a plan to assault on a narrow front in 4 lines, not returning fire until the entrenchments were reached. He achieved a penetration but a supporting action by Wright's Division was routed and Upton had to fight his way out again.

Nevertheless, Grant was impressed with the idea and planned to repeat the whole manoeuvre on a grand scale using Hancock's Corps. The 11th was spent in preparation and on the 12th, the attack went in. Hancock was to attack the salient frontally, supported by Burnside to the east and Wright to the west. Warren was to attack further west in order to tie up more of Lee's troops.

Initially, the attack succeeded well. An intelligence error had led Lee to believe that Grant was retreating and consequently the 22 guns in the salient had been withdrawn. General Edward Johnson ordered them back again but they were still being moved when the attack went in and nearly all were captured without firing a shot. Three generals, 30 guns and a full division of men were taken in the first rush. However, the penetration was not smooth, being held up by stubborn pockets of resistance and by the unfamiliar terrain and soon 20,000 men were packed into an extremely small area.

A counter-attack by Gordon slammed into the packed mass of men with devastating effect and the assault degenerated into close fighting across barricades. The salient, soon to be known as the "Bloody Angle", was the scene of some of the nastiest and most prolonged fighting in the war. From early morning until midnight, men fought at arm's length across the barricades. The hail of lead was such that an oak, fully two feet in diameter, was felled by small-arms fire.

Burnside's supporting attack was a total failure, his men contenting themselves with long distance sniping. Wright's attack went in much more vigorously but his men were held at the barricades and joined Hancock's Corps in the close fighting. Warren's attack, on the Confederate left flank, was late getting under way and did not close in until 9 am. It was soon repulsed and this enabled Lee to send more troops across to the salient.

Despite the long day's fighting, Lee's position held but at the cost of about 6,000 killed, wounded or captured. Grant's total was similar and slightly higher at 6,820. As at Wilderness, Grant had failed to break Lee's veteran army but again he refused to concede defeat. After a further week of skirmishing he set off again for another rendezvous at Cold Harbor.

PLAYER'S NOTES

Union. Those Southern boys have been busy digging - facing you are lines of well-placed breastworks, bristling with guns. Deploy your men and launch the best co-ordinated attack possible. Force your opponent to commit his reserves and hope you can crack his lines enough to break through with some fresh troops.

Confederate. As Lee, the aim is to hold your ground. The "Bloody Angle" around McCoull's Farm will probably fall to Northern assaults but you should be able to regain it. If things get desperate and the North aren't pressuring you on the west bank of the Po River, create an extra reserve with either Mahone's or Heth's Divisions.

SCENARIO VARIANTS

(1). Before the start of the scenario, a flanking move carried out by General Hancock's command along the eastern side of the map caused Lee to re-deploy Heth on his left flank and move Mahone across the Po River. To re-create the original situation, make the following changes:

(a). Add a dawn turn at 4 am on Day 1 and add day-move turns between this and those already in existence.

(b). Remove Confederate entrenchments from the west bank of the Po River and substitute the appropriate underlying terrain as per the map.

(c). Move Mahone's Division east of the Po River.

(d). Move Heth's Division to positions near Spotsylvania and change his HQ's Objective to 8.

(e). Change Hancock's orders to OFFENSIVE with Objectives 5 and 6. Change Birney's and Gibbon's orders to OFFENSIVE with Objectives 5 and 6. Change Barlow's orders to OFFENSIVE with Objectives 17 and 6.

(2). A storm arrived during the night of 11th causing lowered visibility on the following day. To create clear weather throughout this scenario, change the Weather to CLEAR on Days 2 and 3 and remove all fog.

COLD HARBOR

June 1 - 3, 1864

At the end of May 1864, Grant attempted to move his army around Lee and the Army of Northern Virginia to Cold Harbor. On 31st May, a day-long cavalry battle between Sheridan and FitzLee took place and Sheridan managed to take Cold Harbor. He was not convinced he could hold it for long but direct orders from Grant and Meade told him to do his best.

Lee had anticipated Grant's movement and planned to attack and defeat the northern army in detail as it moved up,

starting with Sheridan's troopers. Lee himself, however, was suffering from an abdominal complaint and was unable to take the field personally and in his absence the attack was bungled.

On the morning of 1st June, Kershaw's division attacked Sheridan's cavalry. The lead brigade was commanded by the inexperienced Col Keitt who led the charge in gallant 1861 style and promptly perished in a hail of bullets. His men, who had spent the last two years in soft garrison duties, fled at the sight and the veteran troops on the flanks were obliged to give back also. The attack degenerated into a panic retreat.

By midday, Wright arrived with three divisions to relieve Sheridan and dug in. Lee was obliged to call off further attacks. Towards sunset, Meade pushed Smith's and Wright's divisions forward into jumping-off points for the following day's attack.

The attack did not happen on 2nd because Hancock's Corps did not arrive until 6.30 am, two hours late, and they were too tired from their long night march to assault immediately. The attack was then set for 5 pm but Confederate activities on the flanks, including the taking of Turkey Hill, decided Grant to postpone it until the 3rd.

Grant was convinced that Lee's army was almost finished and this caused him to plan the attack carelessly. Little or no provision was made for communication or co-ordination and virtually no reconnaissance was carried out. The men, however, were deeply pessimistic about their chances and many spent the evening sewing pieces of paper with their names on onto their coats so that their bodies might be identified.

Their pessimism was fully warranted and the attack was a massacre. It ran into carefully prepared fields of fire and few men made it anywhere near the barricades. In approximately eight minutes the attack had been bloodily repulsed and that was it. Grant ordered further assaults but the local commanders to a man chose to interpret this to mean a stepped-up rate of fire only. None would advance into the certain death awaiting them in front. Eventually, at 1.30 pm Grant gave in and suspended the assault order.

Casualties for the battle were 1500 Confederate and 7000 Union, most of the latter having been incurred in the first few minutes of the charge. With uncharacteristic gloom, Grant remarked "I regret this assault more than any one I ever ordered". Up at the sharp end, regret was even greater. A diary recovered from one of the Union corpses held the

following entry: "June 3. Cold Harbor. I was killed."

PLAYER'S NOTES

Union. At Cold Harbor, Grant faced an interlocking system of trenches and fieldworks that would, with the addition of barbed wire and machine guns, have been right at home on any WWI battlefield. Heavy losses are unavoidable and the careful coordination of attacking brigades is essential for any chance of a Northern (Pyrrhic!) victory. Choose a valuable victory hex as your primary objective and attempt to maximise victory points gained against troop losses. And don't forget to pin a name tag to the back of your coat - just in case!

Confederate. The first day will probably see a penetration into your lines around New Cold Harbor. When reinforcements arrive, concentrate on regaining the fortification lines with deliberate, well-timed attacks on the fatigued Federals. Position the artillery brigade to best advantage as the Union attack develops. It can give you a significant edge if used properly.

SCENARIO VARIANTS

(1). The Scenario varies from history by allowing Hancock's Corps to arrive fresh and ready for battle on day 2. In reality this unit arrived in such an exhausted state that Grant was forced to postpone his attack until the following day. To recreate this situation, make the following changes.

(a). Replace the END at dusk on Day 2 with MOVE

(b). Give all of Hancock's Brigades (#58 - #68 and #76) a cohesion of 4

(c). Change Hancock's Corps and Division HQ orders to RESERVE, with no set objectives

(d). Make the North defensive on Day 2

(e). Add 2 to the fort value of all Southern and Northern breastworks.

This should result in the historical crushing Southern victory.

(2). The timely arrival of Hill's Corps saved the day for the South. To give the North a real chance, change Hill's Corps HQ and all his brigade's (#22 - #34) likelihood values to 5, thereby delaying their arrival.

ATLANTA

July 22, 1864

In replacing Johnston with Hood, the Confederate High Command expected an aggressive approach to Sherman's advance on Atlanta. In this regard, Hood did not fail to deliver. On July 20th he made a sortie which became known as the Battle

of Peachtree Creek. Launched against the rock-steady Thomas, it achieved little but on the following day Wheeler's cavalry reported that McPherson, on the Union left, had neglected to protect his flank. Hood saw an opportunity here for a decisive victory and sent Hardee on a circuitous night-march, with orders to attack the exposed flank at dawn. He withdrew the rest of his troops to Atlanta's inner defences and sent Wheeler to attack Decatur and the Union baggage train.

Things did not go completely according to plan due partly to bad luck and partly to bad management. There were delays in the process of disengagement and it was not until 3 am. that the last of Hardee's corps had left the Atlanta entrenchments. The men were also tired after the heavy fighting on 20th and skirmishing on 21st. It was not until noon, therefore, that Hardee arrived at his objective and launched the attack.

The results were variable. Maney's division went in too far to the left and hit an entrenched position. Cleburne, next in line, was much more successful and made a substantial penetration. On the right, however, Bate and Walker ran into an unexpected defence. An entire Union corps, under Dodge, had spent the morning engaged in destroying the railroad to the north and was marching back as Bate and Walker moved forward. They immediately faced left and the column turned into a long defensive line.

McPherson, one of the North's most able generals, was killed in the battle. He was at headquarters with Sherman when he heard firing and went to investigate. He ran into Cleburne's men and was shot down as he tried to ride away. Sherman sent few re-inforcements across, wanting to give McPherson's veterans a chance for revenge.

His faith in them was warranted. There was hard fighting around Bald Hill, held by Leggett but the gallant corps commander Logan took command of McPherson's army and the critical point held. At the end of the day, Hood had nothing to show for his efforts except for 8,000 casualties to Sherman's 3,700. Unlike Johnston, Hood did not fully appreciate that aggression was not necessarily the better part of valour.

PLAYER'S NOTES

Union. You begin the game with your southern flank turned and your first job is to stabilise it. Fuller and Sweeny will probably need help but don't over-react, as Hood's attack from Atlanta must be dealt with as it arrives.

General McPherson was killed during this battle, largely due

to his moving around the field without an adequate escort. As the Northern commander we recommend that you be more sensible in your command profile.
Confederate. Hood begins the game at his HQ in the Atlanta fortifications. He has the option to wait until Hardee is engaged and then control Cheatham's Corps or to move to the southern flank and direct Hardee's units as they drive into the Northern rear. Either choice is valid and as the action unfolds, success can depend on whether you are in the right place at the right time.
SCENARIO VARIANTS
(1). Just after McPherson ordered Dodge's Corps to deploy south protecting his exposed flank, Sherman commanded Dodge to move east and destroy the railroad lines around Decatur. McPherson persuaded Sherman to withdraw his orders and thus prevented Hood's outflanking movement from having devastating effect. To simulate Dodge's removal, make the following changes.
(a). Relocate Dodge's HQ and Brigades to 17,2.
(b). Change arrival time to Turn 1 and likelihood to 3. (This gives this unit a 25% chance of not arriving at all, or else arriving with a 2-7 turn delay.)
(2). Hood's plan called for Hardee to be in position for his attack at dawn but delays on the approach march prevent this. To make the battle begin at dawn, enter the briefing screen for Day 1 and place a dawn turn at 5 am and add day turns as necessary to fill the existing gap. Move Dodge's HQ and Brigades to 8,3; 9,3; 10,3 and 11,3 respectively.
(3). Historically, Hood delayed the commitment of Cheatham's Corps. To simulate this, change Cheatham's Corps HQ and Brigades likelihood value to 6.

FRANKLIN
November 30, 1864
After Sherman took Atlanta, Hood obtained permission to launch what was to be a futile expedition into Tennessee. On 28th-29th Schofield, retreating north, had escaped from a trap, largely due to a mix-up of orders on Hood's side. Hood was absolutely furious and it is possible that this warped his judgement.
He arrived at Franklin to find Schofield dug in and in the process of repairing the bridge across the Harpeth River so that he could continue towards Nashville. Two of Hood's seven divisions were still well to the rear, as well as all but eight of his guns, so he had with him about 30,000 men. Schofield was entrenched with 34,000 and 60 guns.

Furthermore, there was two miles of open plain before the town. Hood's subordinates were aghast when he ordered a general attack but, in the grand tradition of Ambrose E. Burnside, he refused to listen and at 4.00 o'clock, about one hour before sunset, the attack went in.

Initially the attack went surprisingly well, due to a mistake on the Union side. Wagner had two of his brigades in a forward position across the turnpike, about half a mile in front of the main defences. As Hood's army started forward Wagner neglected to send a message ordering the two brigades to retreat and the colonels in charge delayed to fire volleys into the approaching enemy.

They left their retreat too late and were swamped and routed by the oncoming charge. As they ran back, Cheatham's and Brown's divisions followed in close pursuit and were thus shielded from hostile fire. They broke into the entrenchments and tried to turn the guns there on the defenders but the horses had bolted with the primers. Suddenly, tired from having run half a mile, they found themselves under fire from about two dozen guns and when the reserve, under Opdycke, charged in, they were forced to fall back and try to find cover outside the works.

This was the high point of the attack. French, Walthall and Loring, attacking the Union left, were caught in heavy fire from across the river from Fort Granger and from masked batteries, and in small arms fire from entrenched troops armed with repeating rifles. At 7.00 pm, an hour after full darkness, Hood committed the reserves but although fighting went on until 9.00 o'clock nothing was achieved.

Schofield retreated during the night and Hood had wrecked his army. Six generals were killed, including the highly competent Cleburne, one captured and five badly wounded. 6,252 veterans were casualties, including 1,750 dead. Schofield had suffered 2,326 casualties and was falling back on re-inforcements. Hood continued the pursuit to Nashville, to lose heavily in a battle with Thomas on 15th December, but essentially, any hope of a successful campaign ended here at Franklin.

PLAYER'S NOTES

Union. Initially, the Northern commander must decide whether to sacrifice Wagner's Division and buy a little more time or attempt to minimise losses by withdrawing them before they are over-run. Once the Southern attack commences in earnest, try to keep some reserve brigades ready to plug any gaps. Steadfast defence is the key to success at Franklin.

Confederate. For the South to succeed, a carefully planned,

co-ordinated attack is essential. The concentrated fire power of entrenched Federals can easily shatter the most gallant of Southern brigades. Piecemeal attacks will hand a victory to your enemy, tarnishing your reputation as an up-and-coming Confederate commander.

SCENARIO VARIANTS

(1). Most of Hood's artillery was not in position for use during the attack. This explains the lack of guns in the majority of Southern brigades. To give the rebels their full complement of artillery, edit the Franklin OB by giving all brigades the same battery strengths and artillery types as in the Nashville scenario (brigades #1 - #27).

(2). Wood's Division took no part in the fighting and remained north of the Franklin River. To give them a chance of arrival, subtract 7 from the arrival value and enter a likelihood value of 3 for Union brigades #54, #55 and #56.

NASHVILLE

December 15 - 16, 1864

Following his disastrous defeat at Franklin, Hood still declined to see the folly of his ways and continued on to Nashville where Thomas was heavily entrenched with about 55,000 men. As Hood's own army was now composed of less than 40,000 it was difficult to see what he could do. The only plan he could come up with was to dig in outside Nashville, hope that Thomas would attack him and that he could then repulse Thomas and follow up into Nashville.

Thomas was not the most impulsive of men, however, and he watched unconcerned, well supplied behind his strong defences, as the ill-supplied Confederate army shivered in its trenches in the bleak December weather. Still, if Thomas was in no hurry, his superiors were and he received a stream of telegrams, urging him, with varying degrees of politeness, to advance. A cold snap turned the ground to ice on 8th but a thaw on 13th at last enabled him to manoeuvre.

On 15th December he struck. His plan was elegantly simple. Steedman would demonstrate against Hood's right, where Cheatham was in command. Everyone else would execute a large-scale left wheel and smash into Hood's left, rolling up Stewart's Corps. As Hood had somewhat unwisely detached Forrest's cavalry to deal with the Murfreesboro garrison it seemed quite likely that the movement would succeed.

It did, although not perfectly. Heavy fog delayed the initial movement and it was not until 8 o'clock that Steedman went in. His attack met a stubborn resistance and was repulsed but it was not expected to succeed in any case.

By noon, Thomas had some 48,000 men lined up and ready to attack on Hood's left. Stewart's Corps, depleted by detachments and casualties, was only about one tenth of that number.

Several outlying redoubts, however, put up a stiff resistance and it was not until after 4.00 pm that the left wing collapsed. The retreat was not a rout and Hood succeeded in forming a new line, some two miles back from the first and his remaining soldiers spent the night digging in. Hood still refused to run away.

The following day was initially fairly quiet while Thomas got his army reorganised. Hood had also changed around his corps and now Stephen Lee was holding the right, Cheatham the left and Stewart the centre. Lee had scarcely been engaged the previous day and his men held firm against attacks by Wood and Steedman. But on the left, Cheatham was in trouble for Wilson had got his cavalry around behind him, cutting off his line of retreat.

Finally, about 4 o'clock, the artillery rain stopped, Schofield and Smith went in and the Confederate position fell apart. Only a rallying action by Lee prevented the army from being completely overwhelmed. In the two days of fighting, Hood had lost about 1,500 killed or wounded and 4,500 taken prisoner. Thomas had lost about 3,000. Hood had finally completed the destruction of his army, begun with the futile attacks at Atlanta five months earlier.

PLAYER'S NOTES

Union. Thomas has manoeuvred into an excellent position to outflank Hood's lines. To complete this fine piece of generalship you must drive for Shy's Hill and attempt to cut the Southerners off from their line of retreat along the Franklin Pike. Keep your men moving but don't push too hard as some fresh troops may be needed to pry any entrenched rebels loose from those vital southern objectives.

Confederate. As Hood, you start the game at HQ, well to the rear. Initial HQ placement is critical to your control of the situation. The majority of your first line is now useless so you should aim to form a second line of defence anchored on Shy's Hill and stretching to Overton Hill. To win, the South must minimise troop losses and grimly defend the Franklin Pike.

SCENARIO VARIANTS

(1). Forrest's cavalry corps was not recalled from Murfreesboro early enough to reach Nashville in time for the battle. A composite division under Jackson has been included in the OB with a very low likelihood of arrival. To improve

Hood's chances of early cavalry reinforcement, change the arrival time of Brigades 30, 31 and 32 to 4, 5 and 6 respectively and change their likelihoods to 3.
(2). The arrival of two Southern Corps commanders (Cheatham and S. D. Lee) is delayed. This allows a better simulation of the initially uncoordinated Southern withdrawal towards their lines of communication when it became apparent that their entrenched line was totally outflanked. To give the Southern player more control, change the arrival times for S. D. Lee and Cheatham to 0.